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1. Introduction 
We disagree with our friends, colleagues, supervisors and parents about all sorts of 
things. These disagreements affect our disputes in various ways: chief among them, 
the discovery of disagreement may lead us to reflect on whether we’d  better  find  a  
common point of agreement with our opponent, or we should stick to our guns and 
persist in disagreement. 
In this paper I shall tackle the relationship between agreement and disagreement by 
focusing on a family of disputes in which speakers take themselves to be epistemic 
peers, that is, they have access to the same evidence and are equals in reasoning, 
thoughtfulness and other intellectual-epistemic virtues. After having clarified the 
targeted notions of agreement and disagreement in sections 2-2.2, in section 3 I shall 
emphasise the peculiarity of peer disagreement; in sections 4-4.2 I shall discuss 
whether the peers ought to agree or to agree to disagree after the discovery of 
disagreement. I shall take up two popular approaches to this question and point out 
some weaknesses that make them ultimately unappealing. 
 
 
2. Agreement and disagreement: some varieties 
I deem useful to start off with a characterisation of what agreement and disagreement 
are. The aim of this part of the paper is twofold: to distinguish between two 
interpretations of verbs agree and disagree; to draw a distinction between merely 
verbal and substantive disagreement. This discussion will allow me to circumscribe 
the notions of agreement and disagreement that will be the target of the second part 
of the paper. 
 
 





2.1. Activity and state 
In Relativism and monadic truth, Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne offer the 
following definition of the verb agree:  
 
The   verb   ‘agree’   has   a   use   according   to   which   it   picks   out   a   state   of   some  
plurality of individuals – where some individuals agree that P if they all believe 
the proposition that P. There is also a different use according to which it denotes 
an activity, where agreeing that P is the endpoint of a debate, argument, 
discussion   or   negotiation.   On   this   use,   ‘agreeing   that   P’   marks   an   event.  
(CAPPELEN & HAWTHORNE 2009: 60) 
 
John MacFarlane claims that the same holds for disagreement.1 That is to say, there 
is a distinction between having a disagreement, and being in disagreement. Let us see 
what this distinction amounts to. As far as active disagreement is concerned, 
disagreement is marked by various patterns of verbal and physical behaviour. When I 
am having a disagreement with someone I use expressions of denials such as Nuh-uh, 
No, and so on, and I can explicitly say I disagree. Moreover, I can express my 
disagreement by shaking my head, by reacting with an angry look, and so on. It must 
be stressed that these behaviours do not always result in a disagreement involving 
doxastic attitudes, e.g. beliefs. Consider the following case: 
 
(DOWNLOAD) 
Before downloading any software, one has to agree (or disagree) with the terms 
and conditions of use.  
 
In (DOWNLOAD), one typically does not pay any attention to what terms and 
conditions of use are and does not read the entire file specifying them. However, one 
decides to agree or disagree with such conditions. And yet, one does not come to 
believe all propositions expressed by the sentences forming the file. Hence, since one 
doesn’t  form  beliefs  about  what terms and conditions of use say, the activity sense of 
disagreement does not impose doxastic constraints on disagreement. To put it 
differently, cases like (DOWNLOAD) show that the activity sense of disagreement 
does not necessarily target the doxastic states of individuals, for it can only concern 
their being committed to certain practices or behaviours, i.e. the behaviour of 
agreeing with the terms and conditions of use without taking any doxastic stance 
towards them in order to download the software.  
Having said that, there are cases, e.g. disputes, where one conveys disagreement with 
the belief   expressed  by   one’s friend by using expressions of denial. In such cases, 
being in disagreement and having a disagreement are indistinguishable. And yet, 
being in disagreement doesn’t   ipso facto amount to having a disagreement. For 
having a disagreement seems to require certain physical constraints that are typically 
met in conversations and disputes. To put it differently, in order to have a 




Consider Paula, who is a current undergraduate student in philosophy with 
                                                          
1 See MACFARLANE (2009). In the following, for ease of exposition, I will concentrate on 
disagreement. However, my analysis applies, mutatis mutandis, to agreement as well. 





interests   in  philosophy  of  maths.  She   is   in  disagreement  with  Gottlob  Frege’s  
famous thesis that numbers are objects. 
 
This case is rightly described as disagreement, though Paula never discussed with 
Frege. Thus, it is plausible to maintain that being in disagreement and having a 
disagreement can come apart. The example just proposed emphasises two features of 
disagreement. First, the phenomenon of disagreement is not circumscribed to 
conversational cases. Second, disagreement does not entail symmetrical awareness of 
disagreement. For Frege cannot be aware  of  Paula’s  disagreement. 
Having clarified this, let us delve a little more into the usage of the verb disagree. 
 
 
2.2. Merely verbal vs. substantive disagreement 
We may use the verb disagree to characterise various cases that, so long as we 
consider their syntactic surface, appear to be very similar. To illustrate. 
 
(1). (a) Syd: The bank is big. 
(b)  Roger:  Oh,  no,  you’re  wrong.  The  bank  is  not big!  
 
(2). (a) John (by pointing something in the street): This is funny.  
(b)  Jason  (by  following  John’s  pointing):  Why  did  you  say  that?  This  
is not funny.  
 
(3). (a) Mark (speaking with Julie about their common friend Carl): What 
are the best skills of Carl as a student?  
(b)  Julie: He has a good hand writing.  
(c)  Mark:  No,  that’s  false,  he  has  a  bad  hand  writing! 
 
What the surveyed cases have in common is that, in each of them, the disputants are - 
seemingly - in disagreement. Thus, according to a naïve grasp of the phenomenon of 
disagreement, it is plausible to say that it is conceived as extensionally equivalent to 
the phenomenon of the superficial contrast: if we look at the surface of utterances 
and we notice that they seem to express a deep contrast, there is disagreement. And 
yet,   I   shall   contend   that   this   approach   isn’t   a   reliable   guide   to   disagreement.   To  
illustrate, consider the alleged disagreement cases just presented. 
In (1a)-(1b), the contrast between Syd and Roger seems to be a contrast about the 
application of the gradable adjective big to the bank. According to Syd, the bank falls 
into the objects satisfying the predicate big, whereas Roger denies that application. 
But there is another aspect of Syd and Roger’s   case   deserving   further   attention. 
Notice that the word bank can make reference to a financial institution that invests 
money deposited by customers, makes loans at interest and so on, as well as to the 
land alongside or sloping down to a river. That is to say, the word bank is 
ambiguous. As John Perry pointed it out,2 ambiguity can affect sentences at three 
different levels: the pre-semantic, the semantic and the pragmatic level. The pre-
semantic  level  is  the  one  relevant  to  our  case,  since  Syd’s  and  Roger’s  utterances  are  
ambiguous in the sense that if we want to figure out what the meaning of the word 
bank is we have to contextually disambiguate it. 
Imagine now that Syd replies to Roger’s  deny  of  his  claim  by  saying: 
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(1c) Why do you think so? There are 15 counters! 
 
Roger, suddenly, grasps that there is a misunderstanding and says:  
 
(1d) Oh, sorry, I was inattentive. I was talking about the river bank.  
 
This licenses the claim that (1a)-(1b) is a case of disagreement only if we have run 
all pre-semantic disambiguations and clarified the meaning of the terms involved.  
Let us turn now to John and Jason in (2a)-(2b). They are uttering two contradictory 
evaluative sentences about the goodness of a thing indicated by the demonstrative 
this.   Suppose   now   that   John’s   utterance   is   directed to some kids playing hide and 
seek in the street and indeed he is pointing the kids with his hand. Unfortunately, 
when   Jason   hears   John’s   utterance and   follows   the   direction   of   John’s pointing he 
sees that in the same street, but just beyond the kids playing, some teens bully other 
teens, and he says that this, i.e. the fact that some teens bully other teens, is not funny 
at all. Thus, we have another kind a misunderstanding, due this time to a mistaken 
interpretation of the act of the pointing: instead of speaking of a genuine case of 
disagreement, we have to characterise this case as a case of a demonstrative 
misunderstanding. That is to say, we mistakenly think that John and Jason are 
disagreement because we did not operate a disambiguation at the semantic level. 
Let us assess (3a)-(3c) and describe the features of this conversational exchange. 
Suppose that Mark and Julie are two undergraduate students, and they are speaking 
about their common friend Carl; Julie and Carl are students of philosophy, whereas 
Mark  studies  physics.  Mark  is  wondering  about  Carl’s  student  life,  and  he  then  asks  
Julie  to  say  something  about  this  argument.  Julie’s  answer  is  a  case  of  conversational  
implicature: she asserts p, viz. that Carl has a good hand writing, to implicate q, viz. 
that Carl is not a good student. Now, Mark does not calculate the implicature because 
he  is  thoughtless  and,  since  he  knows  very  well  Carl,  he  denies  Julie’s  assertion  by  
saying that Carl has a bad hand writing. Do we count this case as a case of 
disagreement? It seems to me that the answer is negative: once we pragmatically 
disambiguate, we realize that we are facing a failure of conversational exchange. 
These three cases are meant to show that it is a pre-condition of disagreement that 
speakers share, case by case and implicitly or explicitly, a conversational-perceptual-
linguistic background. If the incompatibility of their views is beyond 
misunderstandings, cooperative laziness, perceptual mistakes, and the like, we have 
made a decisive step towards what we may call substantive disagreement. The idea is 
that (1)-(3) can just be merely verbal cases of disagreement, namely apparent cases 
of disagreement due to some conversational or interpretative mistake of one or both 
parties. I propose the following characterisation of merely verbal disagreement:  
 
A and B are in a merely verbal disagreement about p if and only if their 
utterances or inscriptions are apparently in disagreement and this appearance is 
due either to a divergent use of some expression, or to a misunderstanding of 
some pre-semantic (i.e. contextual), semantic (i.e. perceptual) or pragmatic (i.e. 
conversational) aspects of the disagreement situation. 
 
As far as I can see, an intuitive strategy for unmasking merely verbal disagreement is 
to replace the expressions that are allegedly responsible for the disagreement with 
different expressions preserving the original intended meaning. By way of example, 





in (1a)-(1b) if we replaced bank with river bank and financial institution, 
disagreement would disappear, and this may hold for other cases as well. 
It must be noticed, though, that the label verbal might cover also deep disagreements 
about language. Indeed, if two people are discussing about the correct meaning of an 
expression, this disagreement should not be taken as non-substantive or verbal in the 
sense just clarified. To forestall misunderstandings, I shall dub all genuine 
disagreements about language linguistic disagreements, and all putative non-
substantive cases of disagreement as merely verbal disagreements. 
Having clarified what substantive disagreement is not, let me offer a definition of 
what substantive disagreement  is.  Here  is  the  definition  I’ll  rely  on: 
 
A and B are in disagreement iff, for two semantic contents φ and ψ, the 
accuracy  condition  of  A’s  acceptance  are   such   that,   if   they  were   fulfilled,   this  
would ipso facto make  B’s  acceptance  of  ψ inaccurate, or vice-versa. 
 
To  exemplify  the  definition,  consider  A,  who  accepts  “It’s  raining”  of  Barcelona  at  
12 pm. In Paris, at noon,  B  accepts  “It’s  not  raining  in  Barcelona  now”.  According  to  
definition  just  stated,  A  and  B  are  in  disagreement  to  the  extent  that  A’s  acceptance  
of   “It’s   raining”,   concerning   Barcelona   and   12   pm   has   accuracy   conditions  which  
guarantee the inaccuracy conditions  of  B’s  acceptance. 
I defend this definition elsewhere,3 and   I   won’t   reconstruct   the   arguments   in   its  
favour. I shall instead concentrate on the relationship between substantive agreement 
and disagreement in disputes that enjoy some peculiar epistemic features.  
 
 
3. Disagreeing in a dispute: the case of epistemic peers 
The discovery of substantive disagreement with another party certainly affects the 
way in which the dispute unfolds. In this section I shall focus on the idea that the 
discovery of disagreement  could  lead  us  to  a  reflection  on  whether  we’d  better  find  a  
common point of agreement with our opponent, or stick to our guns and persist in 
disagreement. Let us introduce this issue by the following example. 
 Suppose that an undergraduate student disagrees with his (or her) teacher about the 
proof of a theorem; the undergraduate says that the proof is unsound, whereas the 
teacher says that the proof is sound. Furthermore, the teacher recognizes where his 
(or her) student gets things wrong: he (or she) is not considering a particular rule of 
derivation that is employed in the proof. Hence, the teacher has more evidence than 
his (or her) student has. An explanation of their disagreement could appeal to the fact 
that the student is saying something wrong because he (or she) lacks some evidence 
the   teacher   has.   In   such   a   case,   the   discovery   of   disagreement   doesn’t   seem   to   be  
relevant  for  the  rationality  of  the  teacher’s  beliefs;;  he  (or  she)  can  simply  stick  to  his  
(or her) guns, for his (or her) opponent lacks relevant information. By contrast, the 
undergraduate should revise his (or her) belief on the soundness of the proof because 
he (or she) gets to know new conclusive evidence on this issue. In this case, it seems 
rational for the disputants to agree on the issue under analysis. 
There are other cases, however, in which the path from disagreement to agreement 
can’t  be  so  easily  covered  as  in  the  undergraduate  case.  The  aim  of  this  second  part  
of the paper is to deal with a family of controversial disagreements that exhibit 
peculiar  epistemic  features.  The  disputes  I’m  interested  in  are  those  in  which  subjects  
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have access to the same evidence and display roughly the same thoughtfulness, 
carefulness, logical skills and reasoning abilities. That is to say, disputants take 
themselves to be epistemic peers. Two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to 
some question if and only if they satisfy the following two conditions:4 
 
(i) Evidential equality: they are equals with respect to the evidence and 
information which bear on that question; 
(ii) Intellectual equipment equality: they are equals with respect to general 
epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, honesty, impartiality, and 
freedom from bias. 
 
Let me briefly explain why, in my view, disagreements among epistemic peers 
deserve attention in the project of getting clear about the relations between 
agreement and disagreement in an argumentative scenario. 
I submit that when disputants take themselves to be epistemic peers, disagreement 
raises   a   peculiar   question   concerning   the   rationality   of   subjects’   doxastic   attitudes.  
For, the very fact of learning that someone is reaching a different conclusion on the 
basis of equal evidence, and equal intellectual skills may lead subjects to reflect on 
this situation in a more careful way than they do in situations when they disagree 
with someone who is in a totally different epistemic situation, e.g. the undergraduate 
student case. That is to say, while in the undergraduate student case is not 
disagreement per se that forces the undergraduate student to revise his (or her) belief, 
viz.   it’s   the   acquisition   of  new  evidence  on   the   problem   that   leads  him   (or  her)   to  
agree with the professor, in epistemic peer disagreements there is an epistemic 
symmetry   between   subjects   that   doesn’t   admit   of   the   same   resolution   of  
disagreement.   To   put   it   differently,   we   can’t   reach   agreement   by   simply  
acknowledging that one of the two disputants got things right because he (or she) has 
conclusive evidence in favour of his (or her) conclusion that the other lacks. Our 
decision to retain or revise our beliefs is not uniquely determined by evidential or 
intellectual factors, e.g. as in the undergraduate case, for we are equals with respect 
to them. This strikes me as a glaring asymmetry between the undergraduate case and 
the case of epistemic peer disagreement. The very fact of disagreeing with a peer is 
another epistemic datum that could play a role in deciding what epistemic conduct 
we have to follow in this scenario. The question is: what is rational to do when 
confronted with epistemic peer disagreement? 
 
 
4. To agree or to agree to disagree? 
The debate on this topic largely focuses on two opposite lines of responses to the 
question of what is rational to do when confronted with peer disagreement. On the 
one   hand,   there’s   the   idea   that   epistemic   weight   of   peer   disagreement   leads   us   to  
change our beliefs in order to agree with our opponent says; on the other, one could 
contend  that  the  epistemic  situation  doesn’t  threaten  the rationality of our beliefs and 
we are thus entitled to stick to our guns and agree to disagree. 
Before going on, let me point out that in the literature there is little discussion of how 
the notion of rationality should be taken in the problem at stake. Let me try to say 
something about this issue.  
The notion of rationality in place is epistemic. To say this amounts to saying that the 
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problem has to do with what doxastic attitude is epistemically justified after the 
discovery of disagreement. As I see it, the relevant notion of justification should be 
conceived of along internalist lines.5 Internalism about justification is the thesis that 
the   justification   of   one’s   belief   that   p is   completely   determined   by   one’s   internal  
states that are accessible to one upon reflection. These states are what we may call 
the evidence that a subject has in favour of believing a certain proposition. Therefore, 
a subject is rational if he (or she) correctly responds to the evidence, i.e. if his (or 
her) belief is epistemically justified. 
 
 
4.1. Achieving agreement 
As has emerged previously, the debate on peer disagreement hinges on two main 
strategies of response. The first strategy consists of the claim that the rational 
behaviour in a dispute with an epistemic peer is to reach a point of agreement with 
the opponent. This thesis rests on the claim that the discovery of disagreement counts 
as evidence bearing on the object of disagreement among epistemic peers. More to 
the point, the fact that a reasonable agent responds to evidence in a certain way 
constitutes  psychological  evidence,  that  is,  evidence  about  people’s  beliefs.  A  way  of  
looking at this kind of evidence is to maintain that disagreement is evidence on what 
first-order evidence supports; that is, the doxastic attitudes of a reasonable epistemic 
agent towards the hypothesis H constitute higher-order defeating evidence about the 
character of his (or her) first-order evidence.6 Hence, the discovery of disagreement 
with an epistemic peer gives rise to the following situation. If two subjects are 
epistemic peers, then they satisfy the evidential equality condition; to put it roughly, 
they have the same first-order evidence e. However, they reach two opposite 
conclusions on the basis of e, and their different responses to this shared evidence are 
evidence, i.e. higher-order evidence, on what the shared first-order evidence 
supports. So, on the one hand, peers gain higher-order evidence HOE1 that first-
order evidence e supports the hypothesis H; on the other, the peers gain higher-order 
evidence HOE2 that first-order evidence e supports the hypothesis not-H. Is there a 
way of saying that HOE1 is stronger than HOE2? The core insight of the first option 
I’m   considering   is   that   since   what   constitutes   higher-order evidence is an agent’s  
doxastic attitude, and since the agents are epistemic peers, HOE1 and HOE2 have the 
same evidential strength. The Equal Weight View tells us what the epistemic weight 
of peer disagreement is: 
 
(EWV) In cases of peer disagreement, one should give equal weight to the 
opinion  of  a  peer  and  to  one’s  own  opinion. 
 
Christensen, Elga and Feldman endorse the Equal Weight View.7 
The idea that disagreement counts as evidence fosters the thesis that the peers had 
better change a little bit their doxastic attitudes, for if evidence acts as a defeater then 
it lowers the confidence one has towards H. Hence, the Equal Weight View is 
compatible with belief revision, and belief revision is needed if the epistemic weight 
of disagreement is such that we should achieve agreement. 
                                                          
5 For the same contention, see WEDGWOOD (2010: 230). 
6 An epistemic defeater, e.g. a mental state like a belief or an experience, lowers the degree of 
confidence one has towards a certain hypothesis H. 
7 See CHRISTENSEN (2007), ELGA (2007), FELDMAN (2006). 





This way of resolving disagreement is possible if we provide a model that allows one 
to take into account the following three facts facts. First: disagreement is 
symmetrical   defeating   evidence,   that   is,   both   peers’   opinions   are   defeated   by   it.  
Second: paradigmatic cases of defeating evidence suggest that one has to update 
one’s  beliefs   in   light  of   the   impact  of   the  defeater  by,   for   instance,   lowering  one’s  
confidence towards the truth of H. Third: to the extent that I am in an epistemic peer 
disagreement,  I  must  revise  my  doxastic  attitudes  in  the  direction  of  my  opponent’s.  
This amounts either to updating or to withholding my doxastic attitude in order to 
find a point of agreement with my opponent.8 To illustrate the strategy, consider the 
following case proposed by David Christensen:9 
 
(RESTAURANT) 
Mary is dining with her friend Lucy. After having looked at the bill, Mary assert 
with confidence that she has carefully calculated in her head that they each owe 
$43 and Lucy says with the same degree of confidence that he has calculated in 
his head that they each owe $45. 
 
Suppose that Mary and Lucy are epistemic peers. The thesis that peer disagreement 
is  evidence  that  affects  both  speakers’  beliefs  says  that  Mary  and  Lucy  ought  to  find  
a common point of agreement by coming close to what the other says. Agreement 
can be achieved in different ways, i.e. by updating their beliefs or by suspending 
judgment about the issue. 
This is the general conciliationist strategy to the effect that two epistemic peers 
should end up with agreeing on the targeted issue in order to be rational. Although it 
seems plausible to give considerable epistemic weight to disagreement among peers 
because of the epistemic symmetry established by the peerage relation, and although 
this prediction seems correct in cases like (RESTAURANT), this view has various 
hurdles to face. In this paper, I wish to concentrate on the following objection: 
 
The Spinelessness Objection10 
If the strategy here outlined were valid, we would be forced to tone down our 
views by coming close to what our opponent says. And yet, to adopt a middle 
stance on every controversial political, ethical, religious and philosophical issue 
amounts to being spineless, for we would too easily give up our political 
convictions, ethical principles and philosophical views. 
 
This objection is particularly enlightening because it emphasises the cost of resolving 
disagreement. The cost is precisely that of being spineless with respect to many 
disagreements we care about. 
Adam Elga, a proponent of the idea that rationality requires us to revise our opinions 
in cases of peer disagreement, offers a response to this objection that leads us to 
discuss the issue of which disputes calls for a conciliationist solution. Elga defends a 
distinction between clean and pure and messy real-world disagreements:11 
 
(ABORTION)  
Luc is discussing with her friend Lucy about abortion. In their previous political 
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10 I borrow the label from ELGA (2007). 
11 See ELGA (2007: 492). 





and ethical discussions they have always had totally different opinions. In this 
case, Luc says that abortion is permissible, whereas she says that it is not. 
 
(RESTAURANT) 
Mary is dining with her friend Lucy. After having looked at the bill, Mary assert 
with confidence that she has carefully calculated in her head that they each owe 
$43 and Lucy says with the same degree of confidence that she has calculated in 
his head that they each owe $45. 
 
Elga maintains that (RESTAURANT) counts as a clean and pure case of 
disagreement. For we can say that Lucy and Mary regard each other another as peers 
where calculations are concerned. By contrast, (ABORTION) counts as a messy-real 
world case  of  disagreement  since  it’s  very  hard  to  establish  peerage,  for  the  issue  is  
tangled   up   with   one’s   reasoning   and   stance   on   other   related  matters.   The   general  
idea, roughly put, is the following. In messy cases of disagreement the epistemic 
peerage   relation   can’t  be   instantiated  because  when  we  disagree  on  a   single  messy  
issue, we also disagree on many related issues. According to Elga, these frequent 
disagreements lead both speakers to think that, since one believes that the other has 
held wrong views about all these related issues, the other is more likely to be 
mistaken.  Hence,  they  wouldn’t  count  the  other  as  an  epistemic  peer. 
I think that two pitfalls lay in wait for Elga’s   distinction.  The   first   jeopardises   the  
plausibility of the claim that when we deal with controversial case of disagreement 
about, say, the moral permissibility of abortion, we have to face a disagreement on a 
network of beliefs that are dependent each other. This claim entails that in 
controversial cases, the area of disagreement is wider than it appears to the parties 
engaged  in  the  conversation.  Since  Elga’s  reasoning  is  meant  to  establish  that  there  is  
no room for epistemic peerage in controversial  areas  of  discourse  at  all,  it’s  sufficient  
to single out a case in which two subjects, although in vast agreement about various 
religious, political and social issues, are nonetheless in disagreement about a specific 
moral issue. I think that there is nothing weird in setting up a case in which two 
subjects are in broad agreement on a lot of issues that could be connected to a 
controversial issue on which they disagree. This something that can easily happen in 
real-world scenarios. As far as I can see, Elga underestimates the possibility of 
having convergent moral beliefs and disagreeing about a single issue. Thus, the idea 
that when we are confronted with controversial disagreements we always disagree on 
a whole cluster of issues linked to the targeted issue  isn’t  so  solid  as  Elga  suggests  it  
is. So, the support for the general strategy Elga advocates is weakened. 
Thomas   Kelly   has   noticed   another   wrinkle   in   Elga’s   distinction.12  Consider two 
cases, A and B. In A, we first discover all of the related issues on which we disagree. 
Then,   I’m   entitled   to   conclude   that   you   are   not   my   peer.   However,   later   on,   it  
emerges that we also agree on many moral issues. Case B proceeds conversely: 
firstly, we find out agreement on many moral issues; secondly, we discover 
disagreement on other issues. The only difference between A and B is the order in 
which  we   learn   our   respective   opinions.  And   yet,   Elga’s   distinction  would   predict  
that  in  case  A  I’m  rationally  entitled  to  downgrade  your  epistemic  condition,  viz.  you  
are not my peer. By contrast, in case B we start off with a large amount of shared 
opinions, so there are no reasons for discounting your opinion. This asymmetry 
emphasises   that   Elga’s   distinction   is   not   substantial,   for   a   simple   change   in   the  
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temporal order of events crucially affects the satisfaction of the epistemic peerage 
condition. 
In   my   view,   the   foregoing   analysis   weakens   Elga’s   case   against   an   extended  
application of epistemic peerage. That is to say, I found his reply to the Spinelessness 
Objection wanting, for nothing seems to prevent us from applying this concept in 
various areas of discourse.13 
The Spinelessness Objection undermines the plausibility of responding to peer 
disagreement by reaching consensus. In the next section I will focus on the opposite 
strategy to the effect that peer disagreement is rationally sustainable. 
 
 
4.2. Sustaining disagreement 
In the 11 chapter of his 2007 book The nature of normativity and in the 2010 paper 
«The moral evil demons», Ralph Wedgwood argues in favour of the thesis that it is 
rational to have a special sort of fundamental trust in  one’s  own  opinions  that  allows  
one to give more confidence in the proposition one believes than in the incompatible 
proposition  believed  by  one’s  peers.  I  will  dub  his  view  the  Egocentric Bias View.14  
This view is meant to argue against a version of the thesis that disagreement is 
evidence and support the contention that peer disagreement is rationally sustainable. 
Wedgwood explicitly targets what he calls Sidgwick’s   principle,15 that is, the 
principle to the effect that in cases of peer disagreement one should reach a state of 
agreement and suspend judgment about the targeted issue. The Sidgwick principle 
complies with conciliationist strategies. Wedgwood seeks to undermine the principle 
by  putting  into  question  the  very  idea  that  other’s  opinions  deserve  special  epistemic  
attention   that  should   lead  us   to  suspend   judgment.   In  Wedgwood’s  view,   the   thesis  
that  my  opponent’s  opinion  acts  as  a  defeater  for  my  own  opinion  needs  a  rationale.  
The   reason   is   that  Sidgwick’s  principle  puts   special  weight  on   the  other’s  opinion.  
By contrast, there could be other explanations of the significance of information 
about  other’s  beliefs   that  do  not  commit  themselves  to   the  idea  that   the  opponent’s  
opinion is defeating evidence.16 To   put   it   briefly,   since   Sdigwick’s   Principle   is  
special, it needs special motivations. At this point, Wedgwood invokes the view, put 
forward by Allan Gibbard, that every thinker has a fundamental trust in her (or his) 
own intellectual abilities. This self-trust should be generalized as a fundamental trust 
in   all   minds   and   thus   in   all   others’   opinions   for   two   reasons.   First:   our   self-trust 
doesn’t   spring   from   the   fact   that   these  beliefs  are  ours.  Second:  a   large  part  of  our  
beliefs have been acquired by trusting what the others (parents, relatives, teachers, 
supervisors and so on) told us. But if those beliefs were not to be trusted, then it 
would be very hard to reconstruct our whole belief systems without taking into 
account the beliefs  that  we’ve  acquired  by  trusting  the  others’  opinions.17 
Wedgwood  contends  that  Gibbard’s  idea  fails  to  provide  a  rationale  for  the  thesis  that  
disagreement   is   defeating   evidence   because   it   doesn’t   vindicate   an   asymmetry   that  
                                                          
13 As   an   aside,   it’s   worth   noticing   that   supporters   of   the   thesis   that   disagreement   is   evidence   like  
Feldman explicitly acknowledge the force of the Spinelessness Objection and accept its sceptical 
consequences. See FELDMAN (2006). 
14 I borrow the label from WEDGWOOD (2007: chapter 11). 
15 Henry Sidgwick, in The methods of ethics, put the matter as follows: «If I have no more reason to 
suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between the two judgments 
necessarily reduces me to a state of neutrality». (SIDGWICK 1907: 342). 
16 WEDGWOOD (2010: 233-7) gives some details on how such an explanation can be articulated. 
17 (Ivi: 238). 





must be accounted for. Wedgwood makes the case for this asymmetry by discussing 
the case of moral intuitions, but he clearly states that the argument can be extended 
to   beliefs,   experiences,   memories,   and   so   on.  Wedgwood   thinks   that   it’s   certainly  
true that there is a certain self-trust when our intuitions are concerned, for they can 
directly guide the formation of the correspondent moral belief. However, I cannot 
have the same trust in your moral intuitions because I cannot directly base the 
process of belief-formation on these intuitions. To put it in a more general fashion, 
Wedgwood maintains that my mental states can guide my cognitive behaviour in a 
way  that  is  simply  unavailable  to  your  mental  states.  So,  it’s  the  fact  that  they  are  my  
own mental states that guarantee makes them to be more trustable than your mental 
states. This asymmetry can be put in a different fashion by taking into account 
reliability. Wedgwood contends that although I can trust my own intuitions although 
I   don’t   have   an   antecedent   or   independent   reason   to   regard   them   as   reliable,   it’s  
rational for me to trust your intuitions only if I have antecedent reasons to regard 
them as reliable.18 According   to   Wedgwood,   Gibbard’s   view   neglects   this   first-
personal perspective and the epistemic asymmetry stemming from it.  So,   it  doesn’t  
give   us   a   plausible   motivation   for   the   thesis   that   the   other’s   opinion   counts   as  
defeating evidence. 
That  being  said,   let  us  move  on   to  Wedgwood’s  proposal  on  how  a  dispute  should  
unfold in order to attain rationality. 
Wedgwood maintains that when you discover disagreement with an epistemic peer, 
it’s  rational  to  think  as  follows: 
 
At least probably, p; but he believes that it is not the case that p:   so   he’s  
probably wrong. (WEDGWOOD 2010: 243) 
 
Thus, it must be noticed that the Egocentric Bias   View   doesn’t   absurdly   claim  
something   like   the   following:  “I  believe   that p.  Since   it’s  my  belief,   then   I’m  right  
and  my  peer  is  mistaken”.  For  Wedgwood  acknowledges  that  peer  disagreement  can  
often require us to weaken our degree of confidence in our doxastic attitudes. 
However,   to   weaken   our   confidence   doesn’t   amount   to   completely   throwing   our  
view away by suspending judgment. For the fundamental trust we have in our beliefs 
still allows us to give more confidence to what we believe than in what our 
opponents’  believe.  That  is  to  say,  two  epistemic  peers  can  agree to disagree because 
they are entitled to give more confidence to what they believe. Disputes involving 
peer disagreement cases are thus rationally sustainable. 
Let us move on to evaluate Wedgwood’s  proposal.  As  to  the  contention  that  since  the  
view that disagreement is defeating evidence is a special view that deserves special 
motivation, I think that the theorist of the Equal Weight View would reply that the 
special motivation comes from the instantiation of the epistemic peerage relation. 
Disagreement becomes epistemically threatening when subjects are in a position of 
evidential and intellectual equality. The satisfaction of these conditions is a non-
trivial question. For the epistemic peerage   condition   is,   to   put   it   in  Wedgwood’s  
lingo, an epistemically special situation. So this epistemically special situation 
motivates  the  thesis  that  disagreement  is  evidence.  That  is,  it’s  the  instantiation  of  the  
epistemic peerage relation provides a rationale for the claim that disagreement is 
evidence. Therefore, I believe that a supporter of the Equal Weight View has room 
for   rebutting   Wedgwood’s   suggestion   to   the   effect   that   supporters   of   the   Equal  
                                                          
18 See WEDGWOOD (2007: chapter 11). 





Weight View should endorse the argument on the fundamental   trust   of   other’s  
opinions.  For   the   fact   that   I  should  consider  other’s  opinions  as  defeating  evidence  
isn’t   due   to   the   fundamental   trust   in   others’   opinions.  Rather,   it’s   the   fact   that  my  
opponent has the same evidence and intellectual abilities that I have that should lead 
me to give epistemic weight to what he (or she) says. Thus, I believe that 
Wedgwood’s  criticism  to  the  effect  that  the  Equal  Weight  View  lacks  motivation  is  
unwarranted. 
Let  us  now  move  on  to  Wedgwood’s  positive  proposal.  It  is  worth emphasising how 
the  symmetry  breaker  is  produced.  In  Wedgwood’s  Egocentric  Bias  View,  it’s  a  first-
personal consideration, i.e. the self-trust we have in our doxastic attitudes, that 
breaks the epistemic symmetry. Thus, this first-personal, subjective consideration has 
to be stronger than the very fact of disagreement. Consider now the following case 
put forward by Thomas Kelly:19 
 
(CONJECTURE) 
You are a professional mathematician. Within the mathematics community, 
there is interest in a certain mathematical conjecture. One day, alone in your 
study, you succeed in proving The Conjecture. On the basis of your proof, you 
become extremely confident that The Conjecture is true. Because your high 
degree of confidence is based on a genuine proof that you correctly recognize 
as such, it is fully justified. Later, you show the proof to a great numbers of 
colleagues whose judgment you respect. Each colleague, after carefully 
examining the proof, says that it is unsound. Subsequently, you show the proof 
to another colleague, and then to a third, and then to a fourth, and so on and so 
forth. So, the entire mathematical community is united in its conviction that it 
is unsound. 
 
As  far  as  I  can  see,  if  the  attitude  suggested  by  Wedgwood’s  view  were  correct,  we  
should be ready to accept that in cases like (CONJECTURE) self-trust trumps the 
massive amount of higher-order evidence one has collected. And yet, this strikes me 
as an exceedingly strong and unpalatable prediction. 
To put the point in a more general way, the Egocentric Bias View seems to appeal to 
a far too subjective way of breaking the epistemic symmetry established by the 
instantiation of the epistemic peerage relation. More to the point, I contend that 
Egocentric Bias View allows us to get rationality for cheap by positing an extra 
epistemic weight to our self-trust. In certain cases, e.g. (CONJECTURE), this 




After having clarified the notions of agreement and disagreement relevant for the 
discussion,  I’ve  undertaken an analysis of a family of disputes where subjects enjoy a 
particular epistemic condition, i.e. the epistemic peerage condition. These cases raise 
a challenging issue about the relationship between agreement and disagreement since 
they foster a reflection on how a dispute involving two epistemic peers should unfold 
in  order  to  preserve  rationality.  I’ve  scrutinized  two  opposite  options:  the  first  has  it  
that the peers ought revise their beliefs and find a compromise; the second maintains 
that insofar as subjects can agree to disagree.   I’ve  argued  that  both  approaches  are  
                                                          
19 KELLY (2010: 137). To forestall misunderstandings,   Kelly   doesn’t   use   the   example   against  
Wedgwood’s  view. 





unappealing for different reasons. The conciliationist approach has to face the 
Spinelessness Objection; the steadfast response defended by Wedgwood, by contrast, 
seems to offer far too subjectivist a solution whose awkwardness is illustrated by 
cases like (CONJECTURE). 
To agree or to agree to disagree: that still is the question. 
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